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Apportionment and Contribution of
Workers' Compensation Benefits
by Mathew D. Staver, Esq.
The apportionment of benefits between a claimant and a carrier and
contribution of benefits between
multiple carriers has been a confusing area oflaw which has generated
conflicting appellate court opinions.
Florida Statutes §440.15(5)(a) states
as follows regarding apportionment
between an employee and a carrier:
The fact that an employee has suffered previous disability, impairment,
anomaly, or disease, or received compen-

sation therefor, shall not preclude the
employee fram benefits far a subsequent
aggravation or acceleration of a pre-existing condition nor preclude benefits far
death resulting therefrom, except that no

benefits shall be payable if the employee,
at the time of' entering into the employment of the employer by whom the benefits would otherwise be payable, falsely
represents himself as not having previ-

ously been disabled or compensated because of such previous disability, impairment, anomaly, or disease. Compensation far temporary disability, medical
benefits, and wage loss benefits shall not
be subject to apportionment.

Florida Statutes § 440.42(3) regarding contribution of responsibility between carriers states as follows:
Where there is any controversy as to
which of two or more carriers is liable for

the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation. remedial treatment. or other benefits under

this chapter, the Judge of Compensation
Claims shall have jurisdiction to adjudiC8 te such controversy; and if one of the
·carriers voluntarily or in compliat).ce
with the compensation order makes pay-

ments and discharges such liability and
it is finally determined that another carrieris liable for all or part of such obligations and duties with respect to such
claim. the carrier which has made payments either voluntarily.or in compliance

with the compensation order shall be
entitled to reimbursement from the car-

rier finally determined liable and the
Judge of Compensation Claims shall
. have jurisdiction to order such reimbursement; however, if the carrier finally
determined liable can demonstrate that

it has been prejudiced by lack of knowl-

edge or notice of its potential liability.
such reimbursement shall be only with
respect to payments made after it had
knowledge or notice of its potentialliability.
.

prohibit a carrier from apportioning
out the pre-existing condition.

B. Prior vs. Subsequent Carrier

Section 440.42(3) allows the Judge
of
Compensation Claims to require
Though Section 440.15(5)(a) governs issues between a claimant and one carrier to reimburse another caran EtC, it may also be raised in cases rier based on shared liability for the
involving controversies between claimant's condition. Though commultiple carriers.' This article will monly referred to as apportionment
seek to explore the differences be- between carriers, it is more accutween Florida Statutes §440. 15(5)(a) rately described as contribution or
.
in Section 440.42(3).After discussing reimbursement between carriers.
1.
Claimant
Not
at
MMI
Prior
to
the differences, this article will then
focus on the multiple applications of Subsequent Accident
If the claimant has not reached
Section 440.42(3), the section dealing
maximum
medical improvement
with contribqtion of responsibility
("MMI") from the prior carrier's acbetween carriers. 2
cident at the time of the subsequent
injury, then the prior carrier may
A. Claimant vs. Carrier
seek
reimbursement or contribution
Cases involving pre-existing conditions fall into the following three of liability against the subsequent
categories: (I) an injury which re- carrier. Since in this case the claimsults directly and solely from the in- ant suffers a subsequent accident,
dustrial accident and which would the claimant cannot raise Section
have occurred even in the absence of 440.15(a) against the prior carrier.
The prior carrier may seek reimthe pre-existing condition; (2) an inbursement
or contribution from the
jury resulting from the industrial
subsequent
carrier even before the
accident accelerating or aggravating
a pre-existing condition; and ·(3) a claimant reaches MMI from the subcondition which results from the nor- sequent accident. Thus, the prior carmal progress of a pre-existing condi- rier can request reimbursement for
tion and which would have existed temporary and medical benefits. Aphad the industrial accident never portionment for permanent benefits
occurred. Disability falling with- must await the claimant's reaching
in the first two categories is MMI from the subsequent injury.'
2. Claimant Reached MMI Prior to
compensable but disability falling
within the third category is not Subsequent Accident
If at the time of the subsequent
compensable.'
accident
the claimant had already
Section 440.15(a) prohibits a carreached
MMI
from the prior injury,
rier from apportioning benefits if at
the
prior
carrier
may still seek reimthe time of the industrial accident
bursement
from
the subsequent car·
the claimant had (1) a permanent
rier.
Just
like
the
situation where the
pre-existing condition, (2) which is
claimant
had
not
yet reached MMI
aggravated or accelerated by the industrial accident. Ifboth criteria are at the time of the subsequent accimet, then the carrier cannot appor- dent, the prior carrier may seek retion temporary disability, medical imbursement for any temporary and
benefits, or wage loss benefits. If the medical benefits which the prior carclaimant's pre-existing condition is rier is responsible for paying. The
not permanent in nature, or if that prior carrier must await the claim.condition has not been aggravated or ant reaching MMI from the subseaccelerated by the industrial acci- quent accident prior to seeking reimdent, then Section 440.15(a) does not bursement from the subsequent
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and this reimbursement or contribution is not barred by Section
440.15(a) which prohibits apportionment of temporary and medical benefits. As noted above, in order for
Section 440.15(a) to prohibit apportionment of benefits between a
claimant and a carrier, the claimant
must have a permanent condition
(which requires a finding of MMI) at
the time of the accident and the condition must have been aggravated or
accelerated by the industrial accident. Here the claimant has not
reached MMI and therefore the subsequent carrier may not only apportion benefits against the claimant
but require the prior carrier to reimburse the subsequent carrier for temporary and medical benefits. Once
the claimant reaches MMI from the
subsequent accident, the subsequent
carrier can also require the prior carrier to reimburse permanent benefits. Again, the subsequent carrier
does not need to wait until the claim- ·
an t reaches MMI from the subsequent accident prior to seeking reimbursement for temporary and
medical benefits.'
2. Claimant Reached MMI Prior to
Subsequent Accident
If at the time of the subsequent
accident the claimant has already

reached MMI from the prior accident, and if the subsequent accident
aggravates or accelerates this p!eexisting condition, then Section
440.15(a) may act as a barto the subcarrier of permanent benefits.Again,
sequent carrier's apportionment of
a claimant cannot raise Section
benefits against the claimant.·
440.15(a) against a prior carrier from
a . Merger ofInjuries
seeking reimbursement against a
If the claimant has a pre-existing
subsequent carrier.
permanent condition at the time of
the subsequent accident which is
C. Subsequent vs. Prior Carrier
temporarily aggravated or accelerWhenever a subsequent carrier
ated by the subsequent accident,
seeks reimbursement against a prior
then the subsequent carrier may be
carrier, two other statutory proviresponsible for the temporary and
sions come into play. In some circummedical benefits during the peri.od of
stances a claimant-may raise Section
temporary acceleration or aggravation.
440 .15(a) to prohibit certain apportionment of benefits, and in other
If the subsequent accident results
cases, Section 440.49 dealing with
in a permanent aggravation or accelthe Special Disability Trust Fund
eration of the claimant's previous
lays out policy reasons for prohibitpermanent condition, then the subing certain forms of contribution.
sequent carrier may be responsible
1. Claimant Not at MMI Prior to
for all of the permanent and medical.
benefits. The recourse of the subseSubsequent Accident
Ifat the time of the claimant's subquent carrier is to seek reimbursesequent accident the claimant had
ment, not from the prior carrier, but
from the Special Disability Trust
not yet reached MMI from the prior
accident, then Section 440.15(a) does
Fund. See Florida Statute § 440.49. 7
b. No Merger ofInjuries
not bar a subsequent carrier from
If at the time of the subsequent
obtaining reimbursement from a
accident the claimant h1l.s reached
prior carrier. Section 440.42(3) alMMI from the prior accident, but the
lows a subsequent earner to seek resubsequent accident has not merged
imbursement against a prior carrier
with the prior condition to result in
an acceleration or aggravation of
that pre-existing condition, then Section 440.15(a) cannot be used to pro'.' ..
!. :
hibit the subsequent carrier from
apportioning benefits. Section
440.42(3) would allow a subsequent
,. :. in:,Have you ever wishet:i ...
carrier
to seek contribution or reim.,.
~ ,:\.:,'.
bursement from the prior carrier.
Have you ever wished that you could sit down and talk in complete c.onfi' ',: . Since there was no merger, the subdence with a lawyer about yiiur law practice-someone whose drinking qr "
sequent carrie r cannot seek reimdrug problem may have bMn worse than yours, someone who ·can teU .;
bursement from the Special Disabilyou what drinking or the use of drugs did to his or her practice, family .arld :.
ity Trust Fund. This situation
health, or perhaps just someone to listen wi.th an understanding heart rathee ."
therefore represents the third factor
than with judgment and condemnation? Have you ever thought what ·a "
noted above in Evans, namely that
relief it would be, without any cost whatsoever, to .be able to talk f.rankly. ~.
portion of the claimant's condition
with such a person-a·person who is solving problems just like your.s anti ..'
which is due to the normal progress
is living·happily and usefully in so doing?
' .. '. :'. '.
of the pre-existing condition which
would have existed even in the ab,
sence
of the subsequent accident is
Now you can!
not compensable. Therefore, as it relates to the subsequent carrier, that
. FLORIDA LAWYERS ASSISTANCE, INC.
portion of the condition is not the
responsibility
of the subsequent car. 1~800-282-8981
riet. This portion of the condition is
There is no obligation; al/ calls are strictly confidential.
eithe'r related to the prior accident,
or is not related to work at all. At any
rate, the subsequent carrier need not
bear any responsibility for that por-

<',. ;'.
~'

-
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tion of the condition which does not
merge with the subsequent accident
and which would have existed in the
absence of the subsequent accident.'
D. Determining Apportionment
and Contribution·Ratio
1. Apportionment Ratio
For a carrier to apportion out of an
accident its responsibility to a claimant, the carrier must identify that
part of the claimant's illness which
has not been aggravated nor accelerated by the industrial accident. For
example, if a claimant sustains a
back injury related to work, the carrier need not pay for the claimant's
pre-existing vision impairment so
long as this condition is not accelerated or aggravated by the industrial
accident. There may be an occasion
where the carrier may have to temporarily pay for the condition if it is
temporarily aggravated by the industrial accident or requires treatment in order to treat the underlying industrial accident.'
2. Contribution Ratio
When requiring contribution or
reimbursement between carriers of
temporary and medi.cal benefits, a
judge must determine the ratio of
each accident in terms of its impact
on the claimant's temporary disability or need for medical benefits.
Once the claimant reaches MMI
and is assigned a permanent impairment to the prior accident and an
additional permanent impairment to
the subsequent accident, ajudge may
not use the ratio of impairments as
the ratio of disability." In other
words if the claimant has a 10% permarie~t impairment, 5% attributable
to the prior accident and 5% to the
subsequent accident ajudge may not
on this basis alone apportion 50% of
the condition to the prior carrier and
50% to the subsequent carrier. A
judge must apportion based 0I?- disability and not impairment.
E. Death Benefits
The discussion above regarding
apportionment and contribution does
not apply to death benefits. The reason is that it is virtually impossible
to determine what portion of a condition actually caused the claimant's
death. In most situations, the subsequent accident will in all probability
be totally liable for the claimant's
death."

Summary

quent carrier is not responsible for
the claimant's condition not related
to the industrial accident.

Section 440.15(a) prevents the
carrier from apportioning benefits if
the claimant, at the time of the accident, had a permanent pre-existing Endnotes:
condition which is aggravated or ac- I Cf, Rowe & Mitchell u. Rogers I 378 So. 2d
1281,1281·82 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)with Cruise
celerated by the industrial accident. Quality Painting u. Paige, 554 So. 2d 1190,
Section 440.42(3) allows contribution 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
of benefits between carriers for re- 2 Apportionment between carriers also applies
sponsibility to the same claimant for to repetitive trauma. Roz Fischer's Beauty
Unlimited u. Mathis, 19F.L.W. D2229 (Fla. 1st
different accidents. Contribution of DCA
1994)..
these benefits may be adjudicated 3 Evans u. Florida Industrial Commission, 196
before or after the claimant reaches So. 2d 748, 752 (Fla. 1967).
MMI. Contribution between carriers c Paige, 564 So. 2d at 1195; Flagship National
ofBroward Couniy u. Hinkle, 479 80. 2d
generally takes the form of the prior Bank
828 (FIB. 1st DCA 1985).
carrier seeking contribution from the !o Rowe & Mitchell, 378 So. 2d at 128l.
subsequent carrier, However, when a 'Paige. 564 So. 2d Bt 1197.
claimant sustains an injury by a 7 Entenmann's Bakery u. Nunez, 592 So. 2d
prior carrier and incurs a second in· 1158. 1160 n2. 1161 (FIB. 1st DCA 1992);
564 So. 2d at 1194 n2, U96.
jury by a subsequent carrier prior to Paige,
Euans, 196 So. 2d at 752;sce also Nun ez , 592
reaching MMI from the first acci- So. 2d at 1162 n3;Atlas Van Lines u. Jackson
dent, the subsequent carrier may 642 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
seek contribution against the prior nCopelalld Steel Erectors u. McCollom ,587 So.
carrier or apportionment against the 2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
10 Standard Fire Insurance Co. u. a-Haul
clahnant. Contribution or apportion- Company of Eastern Florida, 551 So. 2d 580
ment is permissible because the (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Upson u. Orange County
claimant had not reached MMI, and School Boord, 19 F.L.W. D2096 (Fl •. 1st DCA
therefore did not have a permanent 1994).
condition at the time of the subse- 1\ Evans, 196 So. 2d at 753.
quent accident. Finally, in cases
where a claimant has reached MMI Matthew D. Staver is a 1980 graduprior to the accident under coverage ate of Southern College. He obtained
by the subsequent carrier, contribu- an M.A. from Andrews University in
tion is not permissible when the two 1992 and his J.D. Degree from the
accidents have merged. The recourse University ofKentucky in 1987. He is
is for the subsequent carrier to be board certified in Appellate Law, as
reimbursed from the Special Disabil- well as Worhers' Compensation and
ity Trust Fund.
practices with Staver and Associates
However, if there is no merger be- of Orlando and Tallahassee.
tween the accidents, then a subseij
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